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FENCING THE BUFFALO: OFF-RESERVATION
GAMING AND POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS TO
SECTION 20 OF THE INDIAN GAMING
REGULATORY ACT
Tess Johnson*
“Gaming is for many isolated, neglected and destitute Native Americans
the modern version of the myth of survival, called by some the White
Buffalo.”1
Tribal gaming has frequently been compared to the buffalo as it has suc-
cessfully fed, clothed, and sheltered numerous tribal communities, and gener-
ally improved the quality of life on many reservations.2 Tribal gaming has
changed the lives of countless Native Americans by giving tribes a real oppor-
tunity to be economically independent.3 Twenty-five years after the passage of
Public Law 280 (P.L. 280),4 the United States Supreme Court recognized in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, that Native Americans pos-
sessed the authority to conduct gaming within their reservation free of state
intrusion.5 In response, Congress quickly reacted by attaching regulations to the
now inevitable tribal gaming craze.6
In 1988, Congress’ response to the Cabazon decision was the enactment
of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) which provided for tribal gaming
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. I would like to thank my family and friends for their support, especially my parents
for their patience and unwavering willingness to sit around the dinner table and listen to me
during the whole writing process.
1 Hon. Pierre L. Van Rysselberghe, People of the White Buffalo Gambling Is the Modern
Version of the Myth of Survival for Many Native Americans, OR. ST. B. BULL., December
1995, at 41.
2 Sidney M. Wolf, Killing the New Buffalo: State Eleventh Amendment Defense to Enforce-
ment of IGRA Indian Gaming Compacts, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 51, 56
(1995).
3 Id.
4 P.L. 280 was passed by Congress in 1953 and “required some states, and allowed all
others, to impose their criminal laws on reservations and to open their civil courts to suits by
and against Indians.” Carole Goldberg, In Theory, in Practice: Judging State Jurisdiction in
Indian Country, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2010). This law was significant because
states with P.L. 280 power attempted to apply their own gaming laws on tribal lands.
Melissa S. Taylor, Categorical vs. Game-Specific: Adopting the Categorical Approach to
Interpreting “Permits Such Gaming,” 43 TULSA L. REV. 89, 91 (2007).
5 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987).
6 Courtney J. A. DaCosta, When “Turnabout” is Not “Fair Play”: Tribal Immunity Under
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 97 GEO. L.J. 515, 521 (2009) (“The next year, in
response to “intense lobbying” by states and other coalitions, Congress enacted IGRA to
overrule Cabazon I legislatively and to grant states limited regulatory authority over Indian
gaming.”).
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operations within the boundaries of the tribes’ reservations.7 IGRA’s purpose
was to codify a tribe’s right to conduct gaming for tribal economic develop-
ment.8 In addition, Congress wanted to attach statutory regulations to ensure
that operators and players conducted fair gaming in a manner which protected
tribes from becoming vulnerable to organized crime or other corruptions, and to
ensure that the tribal communities would be the primary beneficiaries of the
gaming on their reservations.9 Critics of IGRA claimed that the regulations
restricted the tribes’ ability to provide for their communities’ needs.10 Support-
ers of tribal gaming accused IGRA of crippling the “new buffalo.”11
Despite the critics’ initial beliefs, twenty-five years after IGRA’s enact-
ment, tribal gaming is still a large metaphorical “buffalo.” It is a multi-billion
dollar industry with steady growth each year.12 Tribes that once depended on
welfare now have portfolios worth millions of dollars.13 However, the one
major limitation IGRA poses on tribal gaming is its restriction on a casino’s
location.14 Gaming cannot “be conducted on lands acquired by the Secretary15
in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe after October 17, 1988” unless the land
falls under one of the two categories of exceptions laid out in Section 20 of
IGRA.16 These two categories permit tribal gaming outside of a reservation’s
boundaries, a practice commonly known as off-reservation gaming or the more
derogatory term of “reservation shopping.”17
Off-reservation gaming is an expansion of the gaming buffalo’s range far
beyond the borders of the tribal lands.18 Native American tribes are buying
land and requesting the Department of the Interior (DOI) to take the land into
trust for gaming and then appealing to their state’s governor for requisite per-
7 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988).
8 Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, The Hand That’s Been Dealt: The Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act at 20, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 413, 421 (2009).
9 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (1988).
10 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988) (For example, IGRA demands tribes negotiate with the
state to operate certain games); see also Wolf, supra note 2, at 53 (there is a circuit split on
whether states have to negotiate in good faith).
11 Wolf, supra note 2, at 53.
12 2003-2012 Gross Gaming Revenue Trends, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, http://www
.nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC%20Uploads/media/teleconference/2012%20Gross%20Gaming%
20Revenue%20Trends.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (In 2012, tribal casinos earned $27.9
billion in gross gaming revenue).
13 Norimitsu Onishi, Lucrative Gambling Pits Tribe Against Tribe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,
2012, at A13, available at 2012 WLNR 16460958.
14 25 U.S.C. § 2719 (1988).
15
“Secretary” is defined as the Secretary of the Interior under 25 U.S.C. § 2703(10) (1992).
16 Id.; UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR MEMORANDUM ON THE DECISIONS ON INDIAN
GAMING APPLICATIONS (June 18, 2010), available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/
documents/text/idc009878.pdf [hereinafter 2010 MEMORANDUM].
17 Justin Neel Baucom, Bringing Down the House: As States Attempt to Curtail Indian
Gaming, Have We Forgotten the Foundational Principles of Tribal Sovereignty, 30 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 423, 423-424 (2006) (“One of the main concerns of states opposing Indian
gaming is what some term ‘reservation shopping’ - where out-of-state tribes seek to prove
rights to ancestral lands in federal court for the purpose of building large casinos in more
heavily populated areas.”).
18 Id.
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mission to operate gaming on the purchased land.19 Theoretically, a tribe could
build and operate a casino on the other side of the country from where its
reservation is located. Instead of being limited to the reservation’s borders, a
tribe can effectively “shop” for a more beneficial site for a casino, such as a
major highway exit or within a city’s limits.
Until recently, off-reservation gaming was a rare occurrence.20 Following
his recent decision to allow two off-reservation casinos, California Governor
Jerry Brown commented that he did not believe applications to build off-reser-
vation casinos would become commonplace.21 Though only five tribes have
received approval for off-reservation gaming sites in IGRA’s first twenty-three
years, the Obama Administration has since adopted a more supportive policy
towards the idea.22 In 2011, the DOI rescinded a 2008 Guidance Memoran-
dum23 from the Bush Administration that only permitted for gaming sites
within a “commuting distance” from the reservation.24 In a few years, the num-
ber of approvals could grow exponentially.
Off-reservation gaming has become a source of conflict among Native
American tribes.25 Tribes that maintain facilities within their reservations strug-
gle to compete with tribes that have applied for more convenient locations
under the Section 20 exceptions.26 These exceptions have been the focus of
several congressional hearings and proposed legislation since IGRA’s enact-
ment 25 years ago.27 Many tribes have gone on record relaying their concerns
regarding off-reservation gaming and how a few tribes’ efforts could harm the
image of tribal gaming for all Native American communities.28 Deron Mar-
19 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (1988); see also 25 C.F.R. 151.11 (1995).
20 Rob Hotakainen, Tribes Push to Open Off-reservation Casinos — and Face Stiff Resis-
tance, MCCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU, July 5, 2012, available at  2012 WLNR 14206480
(“The 1988 law passed by Congress has always allowed off-reservation casinos. But they’re
extremely rare, with only a handful approved by the federal government.”).
21 When Casinos Go Far-Afield; State Needs Consistent Policy for Such Projects, ORANGE
CNTY. REG., Nov. 15, 2012, at Local, available at 2012 WLNR 25585791.
22 James M. Odato, Indian Casino Plans for Catskills Gets Federal Boost, TIMES UNION,
June 15, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 11912171.
23 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MEMORANDUM ON THE GUIDANCE ON TAKING
OFF-RESERVATION LAND INTO TRUST FOR GAMING PURPOSES (Jan. 3, 2008) available at
http://www.indianz.com/docs/bia/artman010308.pdf [hereinafter 2008 MEMORANDUM].
24 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MEMORANDUM ON THE GUIDANCE FOR PROCESS-
ING APPLICATIONS TO ACQUIRE LAND IN TRUST FOR GAMING PURPOSES (Jun. 13, 2011)
available at http://www.nativeamericanlawfocus.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Tribal%20
Blog%20pdfs/June%2013%20Memo%206.22.11%20post.pdf [hereinafter 2011
MEMORANDUM].
25 Onishi, supra note 13. (“But plans for the two casinos are drawing fierce opposition and
last-minute lobbying in the state capital from an unexpected source: nearby tribes with casi-
nos that they say will be hurt by the newcomers.”).
26 Id. (statement of Brenda Adams) (“We played by the rules. We had to stay on our histori-
cal lands. . .. We’d like to have a casino in downtown San Francisco, but that’s not our
territory.”).
27 See S. 477, 113th Cong. (2013); see also S. 771, 112th Cong. (2011); Off-Reservation
Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the House Committee on Resources, 109th Cong. (2005),
available at 2005 WL 3023993.
28 See Off-Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the Committee on House Resources,
109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Rep. Richard W. Pombo) available at 2005 WLNR
18164891 (“This great increase in new proposals has led to new problems for tribal gaming
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quez, chairman of  the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, stated in a  2005
hearing before the House Committee on Resources:
With advice from other tribes, San Manuel believes that further legislation addressing
reservation shopping should . . . amend the two-part determination to require the
secretary to make an affirmative finding that a proposed off-reservation acquisition
would not have a detrimental impact on nearby tribes . . . require that the lands
proposed for acquisition under the two-part determination be within petitioning
tribes’ ancestral land . . . for gaming purposes, require state legislators, not governors
alone, to concur with acquisitions under the two-part determination . . . [and] prohibit
crossing state lines into areas where the tribe has no existing land . . .29
In the same hearing, Cheryle Kennedy from the Confederated Tribes of
the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon believed the following requirements
concerning off-reservation gaming should be added to IGRA:
(1) the Secretary determines that the lands are in the state where the tribe resides or
had its primary jurisdiction; (2) the Secretary determines that the tribe has ancestral
or historic ties to the lands; and (3) the Secretary consults with and obtains the con-
currence of other tribes that have an ancestral or historic tie to the lands.30
This note looks into and discusses the common themes shared by Marquez
and Kennedy, in particular the consultation requirement, the ancestral land
requirement, and the concurrence requirement. First, this note will discuss the
history of IGRA with a specific focus on its off-reservation gaming
components.
Second, this note will discuss the consultation requirement and what it has
to do with the Secretary’s requirement to merely “consult” with nearby tribes
and non-native communities over taking lands into trust. Several tribes have
argued this law should demand a greater level of finding as to how an off-
reservation casino affects nearby tribes. On the other hand, elevating the level
beyond “consulting” with tribes could harm a tribe’s ability to break into the
gaming market and, ultimately, hinder its capacity to provide for its members.
Third, this note will discuss how tribes and scholars alike have supported
the ancestral land requirement as a way to permit tribes to seek gaming outside
of their reservations but still limit gaming operations to those lands to which a
tribe has a connection. Allowing tribes to move beyond ancestral lands has
caused conflict between tribes. It increases competition by allowing tribes to
propose casinos on land to which they lack any connection, and may, in fact, be
the ancestral land of a different tribe. Additionally, overly permissive land
acquisition policies create more than just tribe-on-tribe conflicts. They  create
conflicts between Native and non-Native American gaming operations, which
.. . . It has increased conflict between Indian tribes. It has led to frustration in local communi-
ties who feel powerless to affect whether or not a casino is located in their community. And
it has severely damaged the public image of Indian gaming, causing the public focus to shift
away from the good things gaming has done for tribal self-governance and self-sufficiency,
and instead focus on the perceived negatives of tribal gaming.”).
29 Off-Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the House Committee on Resources,
supra note 27 (statement of Deron Marquez, Tribal Chairman, San Manuel Band of Mission
Indians of California).
30 Id. (statement of Cheryle A. Kennedy, Tribal Council Chairwoman, Confederated Tribes
of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon).
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in turn causes more public criticism against the practice of off-reservation gam-
ing and tribal gaming overall.
Finally, this note will discuss the concurrence requirement which focuses
on the parties that must assent to a tribe’s land acquisition before the tribe may
formally operate gaming facilities. Tribal sovereignty is a unique concept
because a tribe has power over its reservation, but its sovereignty only extends
as far as the federal government allows.31 IGRA is a complex federal regula-
tion affecting tribal communities because it thrusts states into the federal/tribal
relationship. Currently under IGRA, only the governor of the state involved has
to agree with the Secretary’s decision to take land into trust for gaming. Some
tribes are pushing for state legislatures, rather than the governor, to make the
decision of whether to permit an off-reservation facility. Though some urge the
decision to the local community rather than the state legislature, most tribes do
not want a local community to have veto power over their casino claiming that
to allow such is another unfair blockage in the procedural process.
Section 20 of IGRA has been the subject of multiple proposed legislative
amendments and much debate.32 Any amendments will significantly alter the
tribal gaming industry and surrounding communities. Congress needs to take
into consideration these four factors and amend Section 20 so that it can main-
tain IGRA’s policies while at the same time mitigate tribal conflicts, conflicts
with non-Native Americans, and maintain a good image for Indian gaming.
I. HISTORY OF THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATION ACT
Tribal gaming’s past is riddled with legal conflicts between the federal
government, state governments, and the tribes.33 The courts have regularly
found that tribes are a distinct governing body separate from the United States
and state governments.34 Tribes have characteristics of sovereignty over their
members and territory, but are “dependent on, and subordinate to, only the
Federal Government, not the States.”35 However, states are not entirely power-
less over the affairs of a reservation. State laws may apply to Native Americans
on their reservations should Congress expressly consent to it.36
31 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (“These Indian tribes are the
wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States,-dependent
largely for their daily food; dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the
states, and receive from them no protection.”).
32 See S. 477, 113th Cong. (2013); see also S. 771, 112th Cong. (2011).
33 See generally CAROLE E. GOLDBERG, ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed. 2010).
34 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia., 30 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1831) (“The Cherokees are a state. They
have been uniformly treated as a state since the settlement of our country. The numerous
treaties made with them by the United States recognize them as a people capable of main-
taining the relations of peace and war; of being responsible in their political, character for
any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the
United States by any individual of their community.”).
35 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987) (quoting
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154
(1980)).
36 Id.
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P.L. 280, passed in 1953 and codified as 18 U.S.C. §1162, permits states
to have limited jurisdiction on reservations when the matters are criminal in
nature.37 Prior to Public Law 280, states lacked the ability to prosecute Native
Americans for crimes committed within the borders of the reservation.38 Even
the jurisdiction of federal district courts over reservations was limited to just
ten specific crimes.39 House Reports explained that leaving the tribal govern-
ment primarily responsible for law enforcement was in some cases insuffi-
cient.40 Congress remedied the problem by delegating criminal jurisdiction to
states that demonstrated a desire to take on the duty.41 Though there is not
much legislative history on P.L. 280, Congress expressed its concern over
enclaves of lawlessness and inadequate tribal law enforcement.42
Twenty-five years after the passing of P.L. 280, the Supreme Court
opened the floodgates for tribal gaming with its interpretation of the law in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. In Cabazon, two federally
recognized tribes, the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians, were
located on reservations in Riverside County, California.43 Each band possessed
an ordinance approved by the Secretary to conduct bingo games within their
reservations.44 The Cabazon Band also operated a card club where draw poker
and other card games were played.45 At that time, the state of California did not
prohibit all forms of gaming, as it operated a lottery and encouraged its citizens
to participate in “state-run gambling.”46 In addition to permitting a state lottery,
California allowed charitable organizations to conduct, under strict circum-
stances, bingo games.47 These restrictions required bingo games to be staffed
and operated by members of the charitable organization.48 They also precluded
members operating the games from receiving pay for their services, and man-
dated the games’ profits be kept in special accounts specific to charitable pur-
poses.49 Additionally, the prizes could not exceed $250 per game.50 In
Cabazon, California state authorities asserted jurisdiction, pursuant to P.L. 280,
to shut down the tribal gaming because a violation of gaming laws was consid-
37 18 U.S.C. §1162 (1953) (providing that Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon
and Wisconsin have criminal jurisdiction upon enactment; the other states may exercise the
option).
38 Worcester v. Georgia., 31 U.S. 515, 534 (1832) (the United States Supreme Court found
the Cherokee Nation within Georgia is not under the state’s territorial jurisdiction as it has
been recognized by the laws and treaties of the United States as subject to the control and
dominion of the Cherokee Nation of Indians).
39 18 U.S.C. §1153 (1948).
40 Bryan v. Itasca, 426 U.S. 373, 380 (1976) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess., 5-6 (1953)).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 379.
43 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 204 (1987).
44 Id. at 204-05.
45 Id. at 205.
46 Id. at 210.
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 205.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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ered a criminal offense. Based on this analysis, California argued the tribe’s
for-profit bingo and draw poker were expressly prohibited under state law.51
The U.S. Supreme Court found in favor of the Cabazon and Morongo
Bands by distinguishing a limitation to P.L. 280 that the Court had already
addressed in a prior case.52 In its earlier holding in Bryan v. Itasca County,
Minnesota, the Supreme Court interpreted P.L. 280 as granting jurisdiction to
the states for the purposes of adjudicating private civil matters between Native
Americans, but withheld the power of civil regulatory authority over Tribal
actions, i.e. states did not have the power to tax the tribes.53 The Supreme
Court’s rationale was that bestowing such authority to the states “would result
in the destruction of tribal institutions and values” which is something the act
was not intended to cause.54 Therefore, the Court found a state’s authority to
enforce a law turned on whether or not the law was criminal or civil in nature.55
In Cabazon, the California authorities viewed the gambling violation as crimi-
nal in nature, the Supreme Court interpreted the violation as primarily civil.56
The Court reasoned a state’s laws fall under P.L. 280’s grant of criminal juris-
diction only if the intent of the laws is to prohibit specific conduct.57 However,
since gambling in California was allowed and subject to regulation, P.L. 280
did not grant the state the authority to enforce the restrictions of its gaming law
because “it must be classified as civil/regulatory” and not criminal.58 Just
because a regulatory law may be enforceable as both criminal and civil does
not bring the law under P.L. 280’s umbrella.59 Cabazon opened up the option
of tribal gaming beyond what was imagined in 1987.
Congress enacted IGRA a year after the publication of Cabazon. IGRA
was meant to not only regulate gaming on Indian lands, but also to restrict the
land on which tribes can conduct their gaming operations.60 As expressed in
the Act, the general purpose of IGRA included the protection of both the Native
Americans and the non-Natives entering the reservations to gamble.61 IGRA’s
regulatory provisions were meant to “shield [tribes] from organized crime and
other corrupting influences” and to guarantee that tribes would be the primary
beneficiaries of the operation.62 Additionally, the regulations were meant to
ensure that gaming is “conducted fairly and honestly” by both the player and
51 Id. at 205-06.
52 Id. at 208-09.
53 Bryan v. Itasca, 426 U.S. 373, 373 (1976) (Bryan involved a native residing on a reserva-
tion who brought action against the county and state for attempting to levy personal property
tax on his mobile home).
54 Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208.
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 209 (“If the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it
must be classified as civil/regulatory and Pub.L. 280 does not authorize its enforcement on
an Indian reservation.”).
57 Id.
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 211.
60 Redding Rancheria v. Salazar, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
61 25 U.S.C. §2702(2) (1988).
62 Id.
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the casino.63 IGRA divided gaming on reservations into three classes, each
class giving the state varied regulatory authority over the gaming operation.64
Gaming has proved to be a financial success for tribes. As of 2009, 237
Native American tribes in twenty-eight states have used gaming to rebuild their
communities by creating new jobs and funding their governments and public
services.65 In 2009, tribal gaming’s gross revenue was approximately $26.4
billion.66 Given the economic downturn in 2008,67 these numbers are impres-
sive. In 2009 there was only a $300 million drop from the $26.7 billion the
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) projected in 2008.68 Since then,
tribal gaming has gained any footing it lost, reporting revenues totaling $27.4
billion in 2011.69
II. THE LOCATION REQUIREMENT AND IGRA’S EXCEPTIONS
IGRA also addresses where a tribe may conduct gaming.70 According to
Section 20, there is a general prohibition, with explicit exceptions, stating that
gaming “shall not be conducted on lands acquired by the Secretary in trust for
the benefit of an Indian tribe after October 17, 1988.”71 The exceptions to this
63 Id. 
64 25 U.S.C. §2703 (1992). Class I gaming is the least stringent of the categories. Gaming
certified under Class I is under the exclusive control of the tribe and is not subject to any
other provisions of IGRA. 25 U.S.C. §2710(a)(1) (1988). Class I gaming consists of “social
games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming . . . in con-
nection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.” 25 U.S.C. §2703(6) (1992). Class II gaming
gives the state some, albeit minimal, control over the form of gaming on the reservation.
Class II gaming includes bingo where the game is played for prizes with cards bearing
numbers or some other labels. 25 U.S.C. §2703(7)(A) (1992). This classification also per-
mits card games specifically authorized by state law or those not expressly prohibited by the
state. Id. The classification of Class II gaming does not include any banking card games,
“electronic or electromechanical facsimile or slot machines of any kind.” 25 U.S.C.
§2703(7)(B) (1992). Banking card games include baccarat, chemin de fer, and blackjack. Id.
According to IGRA, a Native American tribe can engage in Class II gaming on their reserva-
tion if the gaming “is located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization or entity” or if the tribe adopts an ordinance approved by the Chairman.
25 U.S.C. §2710(b) (1988). Therefore, if any form of gaming classified under Class II is
permitted within a state, the state cannot prohibit the tribe from engaging in those specific
forms of gaming within the reservation. Class III is the final classification and it includes all
forms of games that are not defined under Class I or II. 25 U.S.C. §2703(8) (1992). Class III
games are only lawful on Native American reservations  if they are permitted by an ordi-
nance or resolution that is adopted by the tribe, meet the requirements of Class II gaming,
and are approved by the Chairman.” 25 U.S.C. §2710(d) (1988). “Chairman” is defined as
Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission. 25 U.S.C. §2703(2) (1992).
65 2009 Economic Impact Report, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, at 2, available at indian-
gaming.org/info/NIGA_2009_Economic_Impact_Report.pdf.
66 Id.
67 Nick Mathiason, Three Weeks that Changed the World, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 27, 2008),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/dec/28/markets-credit-crunch-banking-2008.
68 NIGC Tribal Gaming Revenues from 2005-09, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, available
at http://www.nigc.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=1k4B6r6dr-U%3D&tabid=67.
69 Id.
70 25 U.S.C. §2719(a) (1998).
71 Id.
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broad restriction are categorized as either “equal footing” exceptions or the
“off-reservation” exceptions.72
A. Equal Footing Exceptions
The prohibition of gaming on land acquired after 1988 poses a major prob-
lem for several tribes due to the federal government’s previous assimilationist
policy toward Native Americans.73 Between 1954 and 1962, Congress passed
fourteen termination acts resulting in 110 bands and tribes losing their federal
recognition.74 The loss of federal recognition for these tribes eventually led to
their dissolution.75 Ultimately, the government reinstated most of the termi-
nated communities.76 However, the damaging effects could not be undone.
Though the government reinstated many tribes in the 1970’s and 1980’s,
“[s]everal native bands and tribes and over one million acres of land remain
unrestored” as of this writing.77 Tribes that were not recognized or did not have
a designated reservation prior to October 7, 1988, were prohibited from partici-
pating in gaming because they had no land on which to operate.78
The equal footing exceptions treat after-acquired land as if it was land in
trust pre-IGRA.79 Parcels qualify if they are “within or contiguous to the
boundaries of the reservation of the Indian tribe on October 17, 1988.”80 Lands
in trust as part of a land settlement claim, and lands as part of the tribe’s initial
reservation also qualify under the “equal footing” exceptions.81 Finally, tribes
can apply for an exception if the land in trust is part of the restoration of lands
for a tribe that has had its federal recognition restored.82
To counteract the government’s previous policy of assimilation, the crite-
ria for the “restored lands” exception is codified under 25 C.F.R. §§292.7-
292.12. This exception included criteria to meet 25 U.S.C. §2719(b)(1)(B)
(iii).83 Congress provided such mechanisms “to ensur[e] that tribes lacking res-
ervations when IGRA was enacted [were] not disadvantaged relative to more
established ones.”84
The Redding Rancheria is one of the tribes that attempted to commence
gambling on “restored lands” pursuant to one of the equal footing exceptions.85
In 1922, the federal government established a 30 acre reservation for Redding
72 2011 MEMORANDUM, supra note 24.
73 Judith V. Royster Rory, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Fed-
eral Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581, 659 n.19 (1989).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 2010 MEMORANDUM, supra note 16.
80 25 U.S.C. §2719(a)(1) (1998).
81 25 U.S.C. §§2719(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (1998).
82 25 U.S.C. §2719(b)(1)(B)(iii) (1998).
83 25 C.F.R. §292.7 (2008).
84 Redding Rancheria v. Salazar, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109-10 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting
Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
85 Id.
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Rancheria.86 In 1965, the tribe’s recognition was withdrawn and the reservation
was terminated.87 In 1984, almost twenty years later, the tribe’s federal recog-
nition was reinstated.88 By 1992, the Redding Rancheria had taken back 8.5 of
the original 30 acres.89 The tribe owned and operated a casino on the 8.5 acre
reservation but sought to expand its gaming operation by constructing a second
casino on part of an undeveloped 230 acre land parcel that had been purchased
by the tribe in 2004 and 2010.90
The tribe’s proposal for a new casino became the subject at issue in Red-
ding Rancheria v. Salazar. In Redding, there was no dispute as to whether the
tribe was restored, the dispute concerned whether the purchased lands were
“restored.”91 The newly acquired property was located several miles outside
the reservation.92 The tribe requested that the DOI determine whether the par-
cels had eligibility for gaming.93 The DOI informed the tribe that, according to
25 C.F.R. §§292.7-292.12, the parcels were not eligible.94 The tribe filed suit to
set aside the decision rendered by the DOI.95
The Court concluded the DOI can only classify the land as “restored” as
long as it satisfies §292.12.96 According to the CFR, the tribe must demon-
strate: (1) a modern connection, (2) a historic connection, and (3) a temporal
connection.97 The court found that the tribe sufficiently demonstrated the mod-
ern and historical connection requirements but failed the temporal connection
test.98 Section 292.12(c) states that to satisfy the temporal connection require-
ment a tribe has to show either that (1) “the land is included in the tribe’s first
request for newly acquired lands” since the tribe’s restoration, or (2) “the tribe
submitted an application to take the land into trust twenty-five years after the
tribe was restored to Federal recognition and the tribe is not gaming on other
lands.”99  The court determined that the tribe could not show either element.100
B. Two-Part Determination
The second exception is commonly referred to as the “off-reservation”
exception or the two-part determination. According to 25 U.S.C. §2719(b), the
gaming prohibition does not apply when the Secretary decides a gaming opera-
tion on after-acquired lands “would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe
and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding commu-
86 Id.
87 Id. 
88 Id.
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1110.
92 Id. at 1108.
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 1110.
96 Id. at 1111.
97 25 C.F.R. §§292.12(a)-(c) (2008).
98 Redding Rancheria v. Salazar, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
99 25 C.F.R. §292.12(c) (2008).
100 Redding, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
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nity.”101 In addition to the Secretary’s decision to take the land into trust for
gaming, the governor of the state also has to concur with the land’s use.102 The
two-part determination exception has caused the most controversy as it allows a
tribe to conduct gaming on land “in the best interest of the tribe” even if it is
outside the tribe’s reservation or historical territories.103
III. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 20 OF IGRA
A. The Consultation Requirement
San Manuel Band Chairman Marquez has contended that future legislation
should require the Secretary to do more than merely consult with neighboring
tribes when determining whether to take land into trust for gaming.104 As Sec-
tion 20 currently stands, the Secretary can determine that gaming activity may
occur on newly acquired lands “after consultation with the Indian tribe and
appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian
tribes.”105 In Marquez’s and many other tribal leaders’ view, limiting the Sec-
retary’s power to make a decision by requiring a greater level of investigation
could avoid off-reservation casinos encroaching on an on-reservation casino’s
market. This would also help lessen the conflict between tribes because land
would not be taken into trust for gaming if another tribe’s business was
threatened by its proximity. In contrast, creating this provision could hinder
tribes that have not yet begun their gaming operations from ever having the
chance to enter the market. This issue is sensitive because of its potential to pit
tribes against each other.106
Gaming has turned into a very lucrative business for the Native American
tribes. As stated in IGRA’s policy, Congress enacted IGRA to “ensure that the
Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation.”107 Tribal gam-
ing has brought several tribes immense wealth. Tribes whose people once
depended on welfare now consist of some of the wealthiest people in
America.108 The Jackson Rancheria of Miwuk Indians once gathered firewood
to supplement their welfare funding.109 Now, Goldman Sachs manages the
tribe’s nine-figure portfolio.110 Another example is the United Auburn tribe
101 25 U.S.C. §2719(b)(1)(A) (1988).
102 Id.
103 Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light, How Congress Can and Should “Fix” the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Recommendations for Law and Policy Reform, 13 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 396, 466 (2006). For example, in 2004 a newspaper article described how
at least five Oklahoma tribes were attempting to seek out of state land for gaming because
the Indian gaming competition in the state was so fierce. See Tony Thornton, State Tribes
Make Play to Get Casinos Elsewhere Oklahoma Indians are Frustrated by Small Markets
and the Inability to Operate Las Vegas-style Games, OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 16, 2004, at News,
available at 2004 WLNR 21114502.
104 Off-Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the House Committee on Resources,
supra note 27.
105 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (1988).
106 Onishi, supra note 13.
107 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (1988).
108 Onishi, supra note 13.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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which operates a casino a short drive from Sacramento.111 The tribal council
successfully provides housing for its members, builds water and sewer systems,
and funds the healthcare and dental needs of all its members.112 Children in the
tribe are also encouraged with monetary rewards to succeed in school.113 The
Jackson Rancheria and the United Auburn are just two examples of how gam-
ing has vastly improved the tribes’ welfare.
Due to the potential wealth that tribal gaming can bring to a tribe, a major
issue taking root is intertribal conflict from competing gaming operations.
Tribes that have maintained their on-reservation casinos fear that other tribes
are unfairly advantaging themselves in the gaming market. Because they have
built casinos on their reservations despite the inconvenience of their locations
to major thruways or cities, tribes maintaining on-reservation casinos resent
tribes trying to build off-reservation gaming operations. The Picayune Ranche-
ria of the Chukchansi Indians is heavily opposed to the North Fork Rancheria
of Mono Indians’ efforts to build a casino along a highway.114 The Picayune
Indians say the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ decision to take the additional prop-
erty into trust when the North Fork Indians already have existing tribal land is
“primarily because it would be more commercially profitable” for the tribe.115
The Picayune are against off-reservation gaming, stating it is “unjust and unfair
to tribes . . . who played by the rules.”116
Several tribes also feel the consultation requirement is misleading. During
congressional testimony, James Ransom, the Chief of the Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe, commented that a major problem behind off-reservation gaming is the
failure of tribes to consult with the tribes that might be potentially impacted.117
One such example is in the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ environmental impact
statement regarding the Jemenez Pueblo application for a casino along the New
Mexico and Texas border.118 The Fort Sill Apache Tribe filed comments with
the Bureau claiming that the Bureau’s findings were inadequate because they
didn’t consider Fort Sill’s own casino plans on trust land ten miles away.119
The “consult” requirement in Section 20 has proven vague from a tribe’s per-
spective because there is no established standard to review for an applica-
tion.120 Realistically, Chief Ransom’s suggestion that the tribes accept
responsibility, be respectful to each other, and facilitate discussions on the issue
is not likely to happen.121 While the tribes together may be a stronger force,
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Brian Wilkinson, North Fork Tribe Gets Land Approval for Casino, SIERRA STAR, Dec.
6, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 26262944.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Indian Gambling Regulation: Hearing Before the Committee on Senate Indian Affairs,
109th Cong. (2005) (statement of James W. Ransom, Chief, St. Regis Band of Mohawk
Indians), available at 2005 WLNR 10228673.
118 Rene Romo, Change Boosts Jemez Casino, ALBUQUERQUE J., June 26, 2011, available
at 2011 WLNR 12715684.
119 Id.
120 Indian Gambling Regulation: Hearing Before the Committee on Senate Indian Affairs,
supra note 117.
121 Id.
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their personal loyalties remain with the members of their individual tribes.122
The tribal gaming industry has become competitive. For the foreseeable future,
it is likely that for every application for an off-reservation casino there will also
be action from another tribe trying to quash it.
For depressed tribes seeking to acquire lands near their existing reserva-
tions, the prospect of  narrowing the Secretary’s ability to make determinations
over newly acquired lands is a major concern. Though gaming has provided
some tribes with ample profits to support their communities, there are still sev-
eral tribes that need assistance to survive.123 “Of the 550 federally recognized
tribes, only ninety-one of them operate high-stakes gaming facilities.”124 Tribes
that have kept their gaming within their reservation now feel that they are dis-
advantaged by the policy shift regarding reservation shopping.125 The tribal
council secretary for the Enterprise Rancheria of the Maidu Indians stated in an
interview how “[i]t’s really sad right now in Indian country with the divide
between the haves and have-nots.”126 The Enterprise Tribe struggles to support
itself with half of its members living in FEMA trailers leftover from the Hurri-
cane Katrina disaster.127 They are seeking to build a casino on a site with more
“economic potential” 35 miles south of their reservation and are confronted
with opposition from two other tribes that have casinos in that area.128 Enter-
prise’s secretary says the tribe is trying “to get on equal footing” with other
tribes, which have enjoyed a great deal of success with gaming.129
The effects of amending Section 20 to require more than mere consulta-
tion would likely be comparable to the recent situation in Wisconsin. In March
of 2013, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker stated that any of the 11 tribes
residing in Wisconsin have the power to veto an off-reservation proposal.130
Under this policy, there  has to be a consensus between the tribes, meaning that
each tribe has to approve the application, before the governor will concur with
the Secretary’s decision to take land into trust.131 The Menominee tribe spoke
out against the governor’s new position saying the stance heavily benefits the
Forest County Potawatomi, a tribe that owns a bingo casino in Milwaukee that
had net revenue of $368 million in its most recent fiscal year.132 The
Menominee followed up this criticism, stating that the power to veto a project
is “a two-way street.”133 The Wisconsin tribes will continue to reject any off-
reservation proposals put forth by any other tribe. Governor Walker’s policy
122 Onishi, supra note 13.
123 Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through Indian
Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REV. 711, 736 (1996).
124 Id.
125 Onishi, supra note 13.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Cary Spivak, Tribes Can Veto Casino Plans: Walker Says There Must be Consensus
Before Off-Reservation Proposals OK’d, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 1, 2013, at D1,
available at 2013 WLNR 5124507.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
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may keep the off-reservation applications in check, but it has stunted growth of
tribal gaming while at the same time increasing tensions between the state’s
tribes.
Neither side, on the issue of whether to add an “affirmative finding”
requirement to Section 20, is necessarily wrong. Gaming has provided a great
deal of revenue for many tribes. Being able to successfully subsist without any
aid from the federal government is a great incentive to enter the gaming market
and to keep competition to a minimum. Allowing another operation within a
casino’s vicinity could drastically affect revenue that supports the tribe. An off-
reservation casino in a location that is easier to access could cause significant
losses to another tribe. The tribes are simply looking out for their own mem-
bers’ interests, whether those interests are to find new revenue streams or pre-
serve their current business.
B. The Ancestral Lands Requirement
Efforts to amend IGRA to add an ancestral land requirement to “off-reser-
vation” determinations is another issue that has instigated a great deal of con-
flict between tribes.134 Critics of off-reservation gaming claim that tribes are
able to acquire land to which they have no ancestral ties or, even worse, land to
which a different tribe has an ancestral connection.135 In addition, limiting the
available land a tribe may acquire for gaming to that which the tribe can show
an ancestral connection to is not only important to inhibit further tribal con-
flicts, but also to maintain the delicate balance between Native American gam-
ing operations and non-Native operations. Such a limitation would prevent a
windfall to the tribes at the expense of  non-Native operators and the states.
A tribal land application in Barstow, California exemplifies the  ancestral
land controversy.136 The Los Coyotes Band and Big Lagoon of Humboldt
County had arranged with former California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
to build separate casinos off a major freeway exit in Barstow in exchange for
sharing the revenue gained from their slot machines.137 Barstow is a halfway
point on  Interstate-15 between Los Angeles and Las Vegas. As a major hub for
travelers, a casino would bring in a great deal of revenue, which is why the
tribes were interested in the site even though it was not remotely close to their
own reservations.138 The Los Coyotes’ casino would be approximately 115
miles away from their tribe’s reservation and the Big Lagoon’s casino would be
700 miles away.139 San Manuel Band Chairman Marquez has strongly spoken
out against the Los Coyotes and Big Lagoon casino proposals because the
134 Jim Miller, San Diego Tribe is Still Trying for Barstow Casino, THE PRESS-ENTER., Aug.
2, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 15266778.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 James P. Sweeney, Off-Site Casinos Appearing Unlikely: New Policy Set Up by Interior
Official, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, January 8, 2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR
527383.
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intended sites for the casinos are within San Manuel’s own ancestral lands.140
San Manuel has maintained that it is not opposed to a tribe going outside its
reservation’s borders for gaming, but it opposes the Los Coyotes project purely
because the tribe has no ancestral ties whatsoever to the Barstow area.141
To support their argument, the San Manuel tribe claims they would not
oppose the Chemehuevi’s land application for a Barstow casino project because
the Chemehuevi have ties to the land in Barstow.142 The Chemehuevi’s pro-
posed project, however, was not a part of the tribal negotiations with Governor
Schwarzenegger.143 Permitting Los Coyotes and Big Lagoon to construct a
gaming facility there gives them the ability to gain revenue on land that is
valuable to another tribe that actually has ties to the area.
The threat of an imbalance between Native and non-Native gaming opera-
tions could be avoided with the ancestral lands requirement as well. New Mex-
ico Senator Mary Jo Papen recognized the benefits gaming has brought to the
tribes of her state, but notes that the Jemenez Pueblo application for gaming
land has caused a great deal of controversy. The Jemenez Pueblo is a tribe that
is planning a casino project next to a major highway in a town called
Anthony.144 The town is approximately 300 miles from their reservation.145
According to Papen, this intended tribal casino site is only a few miles from a
non-Native racetrack.146 In New Mexico, racetracks are permitted to have slot
machines in their facilities but no table games.147 The Jemenez Pueblo casino
will be able to have both slot machines and table games, potentially drawing a
great deal of business away from its non-Native competitor.148 The tribe also
pays much less to the state than the non-Native casino pays in taxes. The race-
track has to pay 26 percent of its slot machines’ net revenue, while the Jemenez
Pueblo has to pay a mere eight percent.149
Given the disparity of what types of games the tribe may offer to the
public and the tax arrangement with the state, the non-Native casino and, ulti-
mately, the state suffer significant harm. The non-Native operator loses patrons
to the tribal casino, not only because of the tribal casino’s proximity to the non-
Native operation, but also because of the variety of gaming the tribe can offer
since it is untethered to state regulations. The state’s net tax base, subsequently,
diminishes.
Consequently, provisions requiring a tribe to demonstrate an ancestral
connection to newly acquired lands have not met much dispute. Both Marquez
140 Off-Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the House Committee on Resources,
supra note 27.
141 Miller, supra note 134.
142 Off-Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the House Committee on Resources,
supra note 27.
143 Id.
144 Romo, supra note 118.
145 Id.
146 Off-Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the House Committee on Resources,
supra note 28 (statement of Sen. Mary Kay Papen, New Mexico).
147 Id. (these facilities have commonly been referred to as “racinos”).
148 Id.
149 Id.
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and Kennedy support the requirement.150 Scholars have also supported the
requirement as a compromise between the tribes and the states. Rand suggested
that maintaining tribal gaming within ancestral lands could preserve opportuni-
ties and encourage the tribes and states to engage in cooperative
policymaking.151
C. The Concurrence Requirement
Lastly, there has been a debate over who within a state government should
have the authority to concur or disagree with the Secretary’s determination to
take land into trust for gaming. IGRA permits tribes to operate gaming on
newly acquired lands once the Secretary takes the land into trust for gaming,
“but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be
conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.”152
The relationship between tribes and the United States is unique because a
tribe is a sovereign nation independent of the federal government only so much
as Congress permits.153 IGRA, on the other hand, adds a new consideration into
150 See Off-Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the House Committee on
Resources, supra note 27; see also Off-Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the
Committee on House Resources, supra note 28.
151 Rand & Light, supra note 103, at 469.
152 25 U.S.C. §2719(b)(1)(A) (1988).
153 The Native Americans’ relationship with the federal government is unique. When one
thinks of the word “sovereignty” it hints at the power to independently manage a body of
people. Tribes have their own sovereignty separate from United States citizens, but the
strength and extent of that sovereignty depends on what the federal government is willing to
grant it. The result of this pseudo-sovereignty is a variety of case law from the Supreme
Court of the United States that gives certain powers, but not other essentials for having
independence within their reservations’ borders. For example, Worcester v. Georgia is a
case that overturned the state’s assertion of power within the Cherokee reservation. Worces-
ter v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). Around 1830, the legislature extended its laws on the
reservation despite federal treaties with the tribe stating otherwise. Id. at 521-28. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall held that Georgia’s power was invalid because the Cherokee Nation, “is a
distinct community occupying its own territory.” Id. at 561. Williams v. Lee was a twentieth-
century reaffirmation of Worcester. A non-Native who owned a shop on a reservation filed
suit against a Native American couple for the collection on goods sold to them on credit.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). The appeal came from the Arizona Supreme Court
after its decision that the state’s courts could exercise civil jurisdiction over reservations
because the federal government didn’t expressly forbid it. Id. at 218.  The Supreme Court
disagreed and held that a state court had no jurisdiction over a lawsuit brought by a non-
Native against a Native American for a debt contracted on tribal land. Id. Justice Black
wrote in his opinion, “the cases in [the Supreme Court] have consistently guarded the author-
ity of Indian governments over reservations.” Id. at 223. Though the above cases demon-
strate the federal government’s deference to the tribes, there are also a series of cases
reflecting that tribal sovereignty is not absolute. The most prominent decision comes from
Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe. Though prior decisions permitted the tribes jurisdictional
power over their reservations, Oliphant held that the tribes have no criminal jurisdiction to
try and punish non-Natives within their reservation borders. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The Squamish’s treaty stated that the tribe recognized their
dependence on the federal government, and the Court interpreted this provision along with
the Worcester opinion to hold that the tribal nations were in such a situation that made them
“necessarily dependent. . .for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions on their
country.” Id., at 207 (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 555). Thus, the Court has given the
Native Americans a half-sovereignty for although they are in part treated as nations separate
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this dynamic by empowering the state governor to choose whether or not to
permit a tribal casino within the state’s borders. Chairman Marquez takes the
position state legislators should make the determination over the governor.154
His proposal has been the subject of debate when considering amendments to
Section 20. In addition to possibly adding the veto power to state legislatures,
there’s a question of whether to give the surrounding community of a new
casino site a voice as to whether an application should be approved.155 Several
tribes are heavily against having a local referendum in response to a tribal
casino’s proposal.156 Marquez fears a local referendum would dramatically
alter federal Indian policy and create “unprecedented intrusion” into the United
States’ relationship with the tribes.157 Kennedy did not see local input as an
intrusion, but agreed that local governments should not have the power to veto
a tribal development.158 Allowing another veto power to an off-reservation
casino would create a significant burden by adding another step to the pro-
cess.159 Tribes have argued that the local community is already considered by
the Secretary when deciding to take the land into trust.160 However, consider-
ing many tribes have complained about the adequacy of the “consulting”
requirement, where their interests are affected by the proposed gaming opera-
tions, this may not be a strong argument to pose.
In contrast, Senator Papen has supported the idea of requiring a local ref-
erendum.161 Such an action would “[allow] citizens most impacted by off-res-
ervation casinos to have a voice.”162
from the United States, Congress has the power to diminish that power. See Frank Pommer-
sheim, At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal Sovereignty, 55 S.D.
L. REV. 48 (2010). Tribal sovereignty is a complex body that hurts and helps Americans and
Native Americans alike. As Florey poses to his audience, this means that a patron who is
injured while on a reservation cannot file suit against the tribe because of sovereign immu-
nity, and a non-Native can repeatedly commit crimes on tribal land because tribes have no
criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives within their borders. Katherine J. Florey , Indian
Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51
B.C. L. REV. 595, 595-96 (2010). The issues that have arisen over tribal gaming are yet
another demonstration of these sovereign complexities on and off the reservation. IGRA was
considered “an example of ‘cooperative federalism’” because it tried to balance the conflict-
ing interests of the federal and state governments and the Native American tribes by granting
each body participation in regulatory instrument. Brooke Delores Swier, Gaming Goldmines
Grow Green: Limited Gaming, Good Faith Negotiations, and the Economic Impact of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in South Dakota, 54 S.D. L. REV. 493, 498 (2009) (quoting
Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2002)).
154 Off-Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the House Committee on Resources,
supra note 29 (statement of Deron Marquez, Tribal Chairman, San Manuel Band of Mission
Indians of California).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Off- Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the House of Representatives
Resources Committee, supra note 27 (statement of Cheryle A. Kennedy, Tribal Council
Chairwoman, Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon).
159 Id.
160 See 25 U.S.C. §2719 (1988).
161 Off- Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the House of Representatives
Resources Committee, supra note 27 (statement of Sen. Mary Kay Papen, New Mexico).
162 Id.
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Many cities have made the effort to help tribes with their off reservation
requests. Lansing, Michigan recently transferred the first of several parcels of
land to the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians.163 The property is
located in downtown Lansing, and the city hopes the casino will mean “job
growth and ‘incalculable’ economic benefits for the region.”164 With the possi-
bility of 700 construction jobs and 1,500 permanent jobs, there is little doubt
why the city is willing to give the tribe conveniently located property.165
Barstow, California is another city that is welcoming the possibility of off-
reservation gaming facilities. As previously mentioned, the Los Coyotes Band
of Cahuilla Indians has been working with officials toward the construction of a
casino off a major exit on Interstate-15.166 The city has also fallen victim to the
economic downturn, suffering a 15.7% unemployment rate.167 The casino will
bring 1,000 construction jobs and 820 permanent jobs.168
Beyond the prospects for jobs and revitalization, tribes will also heavily
compensate communities in exchange for their off-reservation operations. The
North Fork tribe would like to build a casino on Highway 99 just north of
Madera, California.169 The tribe has agreed to provide the county and city of
Madera, as well as the local water district, an annual payment of $5 million to
finance schools, roads, parks, public safety, economic development, and local
charities.170 The North Fork also agreed to pay the Picayune Rancheria of the
Chukchansi Indians to mitigate the loss to their competing on-reservation
casino. The Chukchansi will receive $760,000 monthly until the North Fork
casino opens and then 2.5% of the net wins on slots till 2020.171 Beyond even
these payments, the North Fork tribe has also agreed to provide funding to non-
gaming tribes within the state.172
IV. CONCLUSION
The resulting effects of the Cabazon decision gave tribes the power to
hold for-profit gambling on their reservations. Congress then enacted IGRA to
regulate the industry. In 1994, public policy analyst Sidney Wolf wrongly
blamed IGRA for killing the gaming buffalo.173 Today, tribal gaming is a huge
industry having earned over $27 billion in the 2011 and 2012 fiscal years.174 It
has been astoundingly beneficial to tribes that have participated in gaming
operations. The ability to operate these facilities on reservations has allowed
163 Kristen M. Daum, City Transfers Land to Tribe for Lansing Casino Project, LANSING
STATE J., Nov. 2, 2012, at Business, available at 2012 WLNR 23288913.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Sam Pearson, Northern California Off-reservation Casino Could be Model for Barstow,
DESERT DISPATCH, July 26, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 15696922.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Wilkinson, supra note 114.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Wolf, supra note 2.
174 2003-2012 Gross Gaming Revenue Trends, supra note 12.
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many tribes and bands to amass wealth to support their members with homes
and healthcare, redevelop reservations through construction of water and sew-
age systems, and encourage young members to succeed in school.175 IGRA
simply confined tribal gaming to prevent unfettered abuse of a system meant to
primarily benefit tribal members.
The “off-reservation” exception or two-part determination exception has
created a great deal of conflict, not only between Native and non-Native gam-
ing operations, but also between the tribes themselves. Lands that a tribe had no
prior ties to are now available for gaming, so long as the Secretary and the
governor of the state both agree to allow gaming on the site. Allowing tribes to
construct casinos in conveniently located, high-traffic areas has and will harm
competing tribal casinos that had maintained their facilities on their own reser-
vations’ land. In recent years, tribal representatives have approached Congress,
lobbying for amendments to Section 20 to better harness opportunities for off-
reservation gaming. Though tribes have expressed several different ways to
amend IGRA with regard to the two-part determination, the general themes
behind their concerns are very similar.
Section 20 of IGRA needs to undergo several revisions. While tribal opin-
ions vary as to the extent Section 20 should limit off-reservation gaming, the
two-part determination needs to be redrafted to reflect the concerns mentioned
in this article. With the Obama Administration’s rescission of the Bush Gui-
dance Memo, the federal government’s policy toward off-reservation gaming
has become more lax. Although current California Governor Jerry Brown did
not believe his recent decision to allow two off-reservation casino sites would
create a trend, it was that decision that established a new environment and
perspective toward tribes applying for an off-reservation site.
The “consult” requirement should be cause for greater investigation into
the effects of proposed off-reservation casinos on local communities and tribes.
The fact that more than one tribe has accused the Bureau of Indian Affairs of
not considering a competing tribe’s interest in an off-reservation casino propo-
sal should be a major concern. Allowing a foreign tribe access to another tribe’s
gaming market has the potential of diminished revenues and will permanently
affect  intertribal relations.
Many tribes have also supported limiting a tribe’s ability to extend off-
reservation gaming to lands to which it has an ancestral connection. Such a
requirement would not only prevent a tribe from overextending beyond land
they have a right to occupy, but it would also prevent them from invading
another tribe’s ancestral territory. Additionally, an ancestral land requirement
would better balance the competing interests of Native and non-Native gaming
operations.
Lastly, there is a question as to who in the state government should wield
the power to decide off-reservation applications. Several tribes want state legis-
lators to make this decision rather than the governor. On the surface, this
amendment is logical. Legislators are representatives of the different regions of
the state. Legislators theoretically would be aware of their different regions’
concerns better than a single governor who represents the entire state. How-
175 Onishi, supra note 13.
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ever, giving state legislators the power to veto could create a new, large hurdle
for an off-reservation casino to pass. Tribes may want state legislators’ input,
but not another veto vote.
In contrast, tribes are hesitant to include local referendums in the decision-
making process. Tribes generally feel that giving veto power to a local commu-
nity stacks another blockage into a stream already full of several potential
vetoes. Still, community input should be an important consideration in approv-
ing and off-reservation casino project. Though tribes already have extensive
procedural hurdles to gain approval for an off-reservation facility, the fact
remains that the local community is the body of people who will be most
affected by a casino’s presence, both negatively and positively. For instance,
tribal casinos provide new jobs and have the potential to spur growth and
spending in the local economy. Finding a way to better include local commu-
nity concerns into the off-reservation approval process is critical to effective
development of Indian gaming and the communities it affects.
Tribal gaming is very much like the buffalo several authors have com-
pared it to. Properly managed and developed, gaming can be a sustainable
resource for the tribes like the buffalo. However, just like the buffalo was over-
hunted, so too could be the same fate for tribal gaming without some regulation
and control. Despite Sidney Wolf’s criticism that IGRA is killing the new buf-
falo, in fact, it is doing the opposite. IGRA has prevented tribes from overstep-
ping beyond their reservation and tribal lands. Instead of killing the buffalo,
IGRA is keeping tribes from overhunting it.
